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We consider a therapeutic market with potentially three pharmaceutical firms. Two of the 
firms offer horizontally differentiated brand-name drugs. One of the brand-name drugs is a 
new treatment under patent protection that will be introduced if the profits are sufficient to 
cover the entry costs. The other brand-name drug has already lost its patent and faces 
competition from a third firm offering a generic version perceived to be of lower quality. This 
model allows us to compare generic reference pricing (GRP), therapeutic reference pricing 
(TRP), and no reference pricing (NRP). We show that competition is strongest under TRP, 
resulting in the lowest drug prices (and medical expenditures). However, TRP also provides 
the lowest profits to the patent-holding firm, making entry of the new drug treatment least 
likely. Surprisingly, we find that GRP distorts drug choices most, exposing patients to higher 
health risks. 
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Pharmaceutical markets are characterised by price inelastic demand mainly due to extensive
medical insurance. Since individuals — once they are ill — only pay a small fraction of the
medical cost, prices are likely to have a limited eﬀect, not only on the choice of whether
or not to consume a drug, but also on the choice between alternative drug treatments. On
the supply-side, there are large, sunk R&D costs associated with discovery of new drug
treatments. To stimulate innovation, pharmaceutical ﬁrms are granted market power (for a
given period) by patent protection.
The combination of supply-side market power and price inelastic demand has induced
purchasers to employ various means to control medical expenditures.1 We can distinguish
between two price control mechanisms: (i) regulation of drug prices (price caps); and (ii)
regulation of the reimbursement level, frequently referred to as reference pricing (RP). While
price caps limit pharmaceutical ﬁrms’ ability to exploit market power by charging high prices,
RP aims at stimulating competition by making demand more price elastic. In this paper,
we analyse in detail the eﬀects of RP on the price-setting strategies of the pharmaceutical
ﬁrms. On the basis of this analysis, we discuss implications for market entry of new drug
treatments, patient health risks, and optimal drug reimbursement policies. While these issues
have received some empirical attention, theoretical contributions are very limited.2
RP of prescription drugs is quite novel, but has rapidly become a widely used price control
mechanism in the pharmaceutical market. Germany’s Statutory Health Insurance System,
generally viewed as the pioneer in this regard, introduced RP for prescription drugs in 1989,
which was followed in Europe by the Netherlands in 1991, Denmark and Sweden in 1993,
Spain in 2000, and Belgium and Italy in 2001. Norway adopted RP in 1993, but abandoned
it in 2001, because the expected cost savings did not materialise. Outside Europe, RP has
been adopted by Australia, the Canadian province of British Columbia, and New Zealand.3
The reference price is constructed as follows: drugs are classiﬁed into clusters based on
1Danzon (1997) provides an excellent overview and discussion of various regulatory mechanisms in the
pharmaceutical industry.
2According to the extensive literature survey by Lopez-Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy (2001), the bulk of the
RP literature is mainly descriptive, and there is a pronounced lack of theoretical studies analysing the eﬀects
of RP systems. See also Danzon (2001).
3In the US, RP has been proposed as a possible approach to drug reimbursement for a comprehensive
Medicare drug beneﬁt (Huskamp et al., 2000). Kanavos and Reinhardt (2003) argues that RP for drugs is
compatible with US health care. Notably, generic reference pricing is well-established in the US through
"maximum allowable charge" programs used by, e.g., Medicaid.
2similar therapeutic eﬀects. The regulator sets a reference price based on a relatively low-
priced drug (e.g., the minimum or median price) in the cluster. The reference price is the
maximum reimbursement for all products in the group. Pharmaceutical ﬁrms can set prices
above the RP, but in this case the patient must pay the surcharge.4
The construction of therapeutic clusters for RP is by far the most controversial task in
the development of such systems. These clusters may be narrowly or broadly deﬁned: (i)
products with the same active chemical ingredients, (ii) products with chemically related
active ingredients that are pharmacologically equivalent, and (iii) products that may be nei-
ther chemically identical nor pharmacologically equivalent but have comparable therapeutic
eﬀects. By its nature, the ﬁrst type of cluster includes only oﬀ-patent brand-name drugs and
their generic substitutes. The second and third may include on-patent drugs. They diﬀer
in breadth, but are qualitatively similar. As commonly done, we refer to the ﬁrst type as
generic reference pricing (GRP), and the second and third as therapeutic reference pricing
(TRP).
We construct a theoretical model that allows us to analyse the eﬀects of the two RP
systems, as well as the benchmark case of no reference pricing (NRP), where patients pay a
ﬁxed share (given by a coinsurance rate) of the drug price.5 The basic set-up is a therapeutic
market with potentially three pharmaceutical ﬁrms, where two of the ﬁrms oﬀer original
brand-name drugs with diﬀerent chemical ingredients. One of the brand-name drugs is an
old treatment (e.g., the breakthrough drug) that has lost its patent protection and faces
competition from a third ﬁrm oﬀering a generic version, perceived to be of lower quality
than the oﬀ-patent brand-name drug.6 The other brand-name drug is a new, horizontally
diﬀerentiated treatment under patent protection that will be introduced in the market, if
the proﬁts are suﬃcient to cover the entry costs.7 This modelling approach enables us to
4On the other hand, if a ﬁr m ’ sp r i c ei sb e l o wt h eR P ,t h es a v i n g sm a yb es h a r e db e t w e e nt h ep a y e ra n d
the dispensing pharmacist.
5The NRP regime is oftened referred to as "free pricing", but we ﬁnd this somewhat imprecise, since RP
in itself does not restrict price-setting of drugs by pharmaceutical ﬁrms. Only the reimbursement level is
regulated, not drug prices.
6Empirical evidence strongly suggests that generic drugs are not perceived to be perfect substitutes to
the original brand-name drug, despite being chemically identical. After generic entry, the original brand-
name ﬁrm typically charges a higher price than its generic version and still has positive market shares (e.g.,
Grabowski and Vernon, 1992, Frank and Salkever, 1997, Scott Morton, 2000). These ﬁndings ﬁtw e l lw i t h
predictions of vertical diﬀerentiation models. Two recent papers applied to branded-generic competition are
Cabrales (2003) and Königbauer (2006).
7One can think of the entry costs as a marketing cost associated with entering a new country-speciﬁc
market. Alternatively, the entry costs can be thought of as (expected) R&D costs, which must be recouped
for the discovery of a new drug treatment to take place.
3discuss the arguments for and against RP systems in general, and between TRP and GRP
in particular.
The main argument in favour of RP is that it stimulates price competition by making
demand more elastic, resulting in lower medical expenditures.8 Intuitively, the eﬀect on price
competition should be stronger the wider the cluster is deﬁned. Our model conﬁrms this
line of argument. We show that the price of every drug in the therapeutic market is highest
under NRP and lowest under TRP.9 It is worth noting that GRP not only reduces prices
of the drugs in the reference cluster, but also puts a downward pressure on the price of the
non-included, but therapeutically equivalent, drug.10 This is due to prices being strategic
complements.
The inclusion of on-patent drugs is perhaps the main source of controversy over RP-
systems. It is argued that TRP per se eﬀectively eliminates patent protection and will stiﬂe
innovation in drug therapy, while GRP, on the other hand, is considered to have a minimal
eﬀect on incentives for R&D since it applies only to oﬀ-patent drugs (see e.g., Danzon, 2001,
Lopez-Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy, 2000). Our model conﬁrms the ﬁrst line of the argument,
but not the second. We show that TRP provides the lowest proﬁts to the patent-holding ﬁrm,
making market entry (and innovation) of the new drug treatment least likely.11 However,
we also ﬁnd that a patent-holding ﬁrm can be negatively aﬀected by RP, even if on-patent
drugs are exempted from this particular reimbursement system. Stronger price competition
induced by GRP forces the patent-holding ﬁrm to lower the price of its drug in order to
reduce the loss of market shares.
Another important concern about TRP is that this system forces a large number of
patients to opt for a less suitable drug simply to avoid the extra copayment. The broader
the therapeutic cluster, the more severe is the trade-oﬀ between surcharges and increased
health risks to patients.12 GRP, on the other hand, is said to conserve third party funds
8To be precise, demand becomes more elastic above the reference price. Unless the reference price is set
equal to the lowest priced drug in the cluster, the price elasticity of demand remains unchanged below the
reference price.
9Pavcnik (2002) provides strong evidence from Germany that the introduction of RP has induced phar-
maceutical prices to drop, the eﬀect being stronger for branded drugs facing generic competition. Aronsson
et al. (2001) and Bergman and Rudholm (2003) provide similar evidence from Sweden.
10A recent paper by Brekke et al. (2006b) provides empirical evidence on a cross-price eﬀect of (generic)
RP on non-included therapeutic substitutes.
11This result has empirical support from Danzon and Ketcham (2004) who analyse the eﬀect of RP on the
availability of drugs in Germany, the Netherlands and New Zealand.
12Lopez-Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy (2000, p. 111) formulate this problem as follows:
"First, if there is no interchangeability at the level of the individual patient [...] then the co-
4without exposing patients to signiﬁcant risks, because it applies to substitution only among
generically equivalent drugs that have demonstrated bioequivalence to the original brand-
name drug. For given prices, this is, of course, trivially true. However, the intention of
the RP systems is to induce price responses from the pharmaceutical ﬁrms. Taking this
into account, we show that, in fact, GRP distorts drug choices most, exposing patients to
higher health risks. Since the on-patent drug is exempted from reference pricing under GRP,
the patent-holding ﬁrm faces a less price-elastic demand than its competitors, and can thus
charge a considerably higher price. This induces a larger fraction of patients to choose the
drugs that are included in the reference cluster, which are less suitable, but has a lower
copayment.
In terms of policy implications, our results suggest no clear-cut conclusions about the
optimal choice of reimbursement system. We can, however, make distinctions among the
following general cases. If the costs of launching a new drug in a speciﬁc country are low,
with a corresponding low risk of no market entry for new drugs, then TRP is clearly socially
favourable.13,14 However, if this is not the case, then either NRP or GRP might be necessary
to stimulate market entry. The choice between NRP and GRP implies a trade-oﬀ,s i n c et h e
former yields higher drug expenditures but lower health risks to patients. A social planner’s
evaluation of this particular trade-oﬀ is determined by the importance of drug expenditures
in the planner’s objective function. GRP might thus be the favoured reimbursement system
in countries where the pharmaceutical industry is insigniﬁcant or non-existent, while NRP
might be preferred otherwise.
The theoretical literature on RP is, as mentioned above, very limited, with only a couple
of notable exceptions. Zweifel and Crivelli (1996) analyse the pricing responses to the intro-
duction of a RP system using a Bertrand duopoly model. They frame their analysis in the
payment may become not avoidable and the RP system may discriminate against some patients.
Second, selection of a drug under a RP category may result in a lower level of eﬀectiveness and
potentially harmful side eﬀects for the patient because the drug is chosen simply with a view to
avoiding the copayment".
The same argument is presented by Danzon (2001).
13Country-speciﬁc launching costs include typically marketing activities like providing information about
the drug to the government in order to obtain sales approval and, potentially, listing in the reimbursement
plan, promotion of the drug to physicians (detailing), etc.
14In a broader perspective, the introduction of TRP may inﬂuence the global launch decision. If large (and
rich) countries — like the US and the UK — implement TRP, this may have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the global
returns on a new drug, which in turn may induce lower R&D investments. On the other hand, it has been
argued that TRP induces more R&D investments in drastic relative to "me-too" innovations. The net eﬀect
of TRP on global welfare is thus not clear-cut, and deﬁnitely outside the scope of the current paper.
5context of the introduction of the TRP system in Germany in 1989. Danzon and Liu (1996)
use a monopolistic competition model with kinked demand and imperfect physician agency
to predict price responses to RP. The modelling approaches are distinctly diﬀerent from ours.
The combination of horizontal and vertical diﬀerentiation allows us to analyse and compare
GRP and TRP closely. Moreover, our model also enables the analysis of market entry and
health risks to patients, which are lacking in the above mentioned studies.15
Our paper contributes also to the more general literature on horizontal and vertical
product diﬀerentiation. Most papers within this ﬁeld allow ﬁrms to invest in quality, but
assume consumers to diﬀer only in terms of the horizontal space (taste).16 The present
paper explicitly combines the horizontal diﬀerentiation framework of Hotelling (1929) with
the vertical diﬀerentiation framework introduced by Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979, 1980)
and Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983). While these two approaches typically are applied
separately, the pharmaceutical market — with both inter-brand (branded vs branded) and
intra-brand (branded vs generic) competition — serves as a natural example for combining
these frameworks.
The paper is structured as follows: in section 2, the model is presented. In section 3,
the equilibrium prices are derived and characterised for all three regimes. Section 4 analyses
the market entry decision of the ﬁrm with the new drug treatment. Section 5 analyses the
welfare properties of the three diﬀerent regimes, and presents some policy implications. In
section 6, we extend our model to the special case of no coinsurance. Finally, Section 7
provides a discussion and some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
Consider a particular therapeutic market for prescription drugs with the following charac-
teristics. There are two patient types, indexed by j = H,L,d i ﬀering with respect to their
gross valuation of drug treatment, due to, e.g., diﬀerent degrees of illness. A fraction λ of
15These important aspects of RP-systems are also absent in Merino-Castelló (2003), who studies the price
eﬀects of generic reference pricing in a vertical diﬀerentiation model.
16Several papers have added quality competition to a standard Hotelling-framework, see e.g., Ma and
Burgess (1993) for the case of ﬁxed locations under both price competition and price regulation, Economides
(1989) for the case of endogenous locations and price competition, and Brekke et al. (2006a) for the case
of endogenous locations and price regulation. However, none of these papers allow consumers to diﬀer with
respect to their willingness-to-pay for quality, which means that the vertical diﬀerentiation framework is not
explicitly dealt with.
6the patients are H-types, with a gross valuation v; the remaining patients — the L-types —
have a gross valuation γv,w h e r eγ ∈ (0,1). Both patient types are uniformly distributed on
t h el i n es e g m e n tS =[ 0 ,1], with a total mass of 1, where the location of an arbitrary patient,
x ∈ S, is associated with the patient’s susceptibility towards speciﬁc drug characteristics. A
"mismatch cost" parameter t measures the utility loss per unit of distance between a patent’s
ideal treatment — given by his location on S — and the drug actually consumed. We can think
of such mismatch costs as reﬂecting various side-eﬀects or contraindications that reduce the
gross valuation of drug treatment.
There are potentially three pharmaceutical single-product ﬁrms, indexed by i =0 ,1,G,
operating in the market. Firms 0 and 1 oﬀer original brand-name drugs at prices p0 and p1,
respectively. These drugs, which diﬀer with respect to chemical compounds, are located at
either end of the unit interval S,r e ﬂecting their horizontally diﬀerentiated treatment eﬀects.
We assume that drug 1 is a new treatment version — still under patent protection — that
will be introduced in this particular market, if variable proﬁts are suﬃcient to cover entry
costs. Drug 0, on the other hand, has already lost its patent protection and faces generic
competition from a third pharmaceutical ﬁrm G,o ﬀering a generic drug version at a price
pG. In terms of horizontal diﬀerentiation, the generic drug is (naturally) also positioned at 0.
However, in the eyes of the patients, 0 and G are vertically diﬀerentiated.T h i si sc a p t u r e db y
assuming that patients’ gross valuation of the generic drug is deﬂated by a factor θ ∈ (0,1).
Thus, the perceived quality diﬀerence between the two versions of drug treatment 0 is given
by (1 − θ). This vertical diﬀerentiation might be due to diﬀerences in advertising intensity
that creates perceived quality diﬀerences, or simply that the brand-name drug is perceived
to be safer due to a longer life in the market.
Each patient needs one unit of either drug version. A patient of type j who is located at





uj − t|x − i| − ci if i =0 ,1







vi f j = H
γv if j = L
, (2)
7and ci is the patient copayment for drug i. In absence of a reference price system, the patient
copayment for drug i is given by ci = αpi+f,w h e r eα ∈ (0,1) is the coinsurance rate and f is
the deductible (or a ﬂat fee).17 Since patients pay the same deductible irrespective of which
drug they decide to buy, f does not aﬀect drug choices and can therefore be normalised to
zero, without any loss of generality. On the other hand, in the presence of a reference price
system, the copayment is based on a reference price p, and the patients must additionally
pay the full price diﬀerence if choosing a drug in the reference group which is priced in excess






αpi if pi ≤ p
αp +( pi − p) if pi > p
. (3)
We analyse a three-stage game with the following sequence of events:
1. A benevolent regulator decides on the socially optimal drug reimbursement policy to
implement. She chooses among the following policies: (i) no reference pricing (NRP),
(ii) therapeutic reference pricing (TRP), or (iii) generic reference pricing (GRP).
2. Firm 1 decides whether to enter the market and thus to oﬀer a new treatment, given
that treatment 0 already exists and is oﬀered in the form of both an original version
(drug 0) and a generic substitute (drug G).
3. All pharmaceutical ﬁrms in the market play a simultaneous pricing game.
As usual, the game is solved by backward induction.
3 Drug pricing
In this section we derive the optimal pricing strategies of the pharmaceutical ﬁrms for each
of the three possible reimbursement regimes. We look for an equilibrium where all ﬁrms are
active and compete in terms of prices. This requires some restrictions on the parameters.
More speciﬁcally, we assume that the mismatch cost parameter t is bounded from both
17This copayment system is the most common one (see e.g., Kanavos, 2001). However, some countries
(e.g., the Netherlands) do not have any coinsurance element in the patient copayment. In the US, tiered
formularies are typically used instead of coinsurance, except for the new Medicare prescription drug plan,
which may include coinsurance. In Section 6 we extend the model to capture also the special case of no
coinsurance (i.e., α =0 ), while Section 7 includes a brief discussion of tiered formularies.




, where the lower and upper bounds are functions of the




, there exists a vertically
separating equilibrium, where the brand-name drug 0 i sp r i c e d‘ h i g h ’a n dc o n s u m e db yt h e
H-types only, while the generic substitute G is priced ‘low’ and consumed by the L-types
only.18 On the other hand, the horizontally diﬀerentiated brand-name drug 1 is consumed
by both types in equilibrium. This is the only possible type of equilibrium where the generic
drug can survive in the market, since all patients prefer drug 0 over drug G if c0 = cG,
implying that either all or no patients of type j prefer 0 over G if c0 6= cG.
It is worth noting that, in this context, it makes considerable intuitive sense to focus on
intermediate values of the mismatch cost parameter t. On the one hand, a very low t is not
compatible with patent protection, since a new drug must be suﬃciently diﬀerentiated to
obtain a patent. On the other hand, a very high t is not compatible with the notion of a
‘therapeutic market’. In particular, the idea of therapeutic reference pricing requires that
the drugs included in a reference group are not too diﬀerentiated.
Demand and proﬁts
Let us ﬁr s td e r i v ed r u gd e m a n df o re a c hﬁrm, under the assumption of vertical market
segmentation. This requires the identiﬁcation of two indiﬀerent patients; one for each of the
two patient types.
The H-types choose between the two brand-name drugs, and the location of the indiﬀer-
ent H-type patient, denoted e xH, is given by the solution to









The L-types, on the other hand, choose between the generic drug G and the horizontally
diﬀerentiated brand-name drug 1. The location of the indiﬀerent L-type patient, denoted




, k = NRP, TRP, GRP.I n
other words, there is a common lower bound on t in all three regimes, whereas the upper bound generally













Figure 1: Illustration of the demand system
e xL, is given by the solution to






c1 − cG − γv(1 − θ)
2t
. (5)
Under the additional assumption of full market coverage, so that all patients obtain non-
negative utility from the consumption of their most preferred drug, the demand facing ﬁrm
i is given by19
Di =

    
    
λe xH if i =0
λ(1 − e xH)+( 1− λ)(1− e xL) if i =1
(1 − λ)e xL if i = G
. (6)
Finally, assuming zero production costs, (variable) proﬁts for ﬁrm i are simply given by20
πi = piDi. (7)
19Figure 1 illustrates the demand system.
20At this stage, market entry costs (R&D costs and/or marketing costs) are sunk and thus plays no role
for the analysis.
103.1 No reference pricing (NRP)
In the absence of any reference price system, the patient copayment for drug consumption




Explicit expressions for the proﬁt functions under the NRP-system are easily found by using
(8) in (4)-(7). In equilibrium, the two-brand name producers choose prices pNRP
0 and pNRP
1
that maximise π0 and π1, respectively, as deﬁned by (7). The optimal strategy for the generic
producer, on the other hand, is to choose a price pNRP
G that is just low enough to make it
unproﬁtable for ﬁrm 0 to deviate from pNRP
0 by setting a ‘low’ price that also captures the















[3t∆G − γv(1 − θ)], (11)
where
∆0 :=





λ2 +3 ( 1− λ)











λ2 +3 ( 1− λ)
¢ > 0, (13)
∆G :=





λ2 +3 ( 1− λ)
¢ > 0. (14)
We see that all prices are increasing in t and decreasing in α.H i g h e rm i s m a t c hc o s t sr e -
duce the substitutability, and thus the degree of competition, between the brand-name drugs,
leading to higher prices. A higher coinsurance rate, on the other hand, increases the price
elasticity of drug demand, leading to lower prices in equilibrium. It is also straightforward to
show that ∂∆i/∂λ > 0,i m p l y i n g∂pi/∂λ > 0, for all i =0 ,1,G. A higher fraction of H-types
implies an increase in the overall willingness to pay, with a corresponding price increase, for
the original drugs. This price increase also enables the generic producer to charge a higher
21A full derivation of the equilibrium is given in the Appendix.
11price in equilibrium.22 Note also that a reduction of the perceived quality diﬀerence between
the two versions of treatment 0 (i.e., an increase in θ) leads to a higher price for the generic
drug version, as expected.
On the other hand, a higher gross valuation of drug treatment for the L-types — i.e.,
an increase in γ—l e a d st oalower generic price in equilibrium. The reason is that a higher
gross valuation for the L-types, implying a higher willingness-to-pay for drugs, makes it more
proﬁtable for ﬁrm 0 to lower its price in order to capture the L-segment of the market. Con-
sequently, the generic ﬁrm must reduce its price in order to prevent this price-undercutting
strategy from the brand-name ﬁrm. If the diﬀerence in gross valuations between the two
patient types becomes suﬃciently small — i.e., if γ becomes suﬃciently close to 1 —i ti sn o t
possible for the generic ﬁrm, with a (perceived) lower-quality product, to prevent that the
brand-name ﬁrm serves both patient types in equilibrium. In this case, the generic drug is
driven out of the market.
















































Proposition 1 Under NRP, the brand-name drug with a generic substitute always charges
the highest price in equilibrium. Both patient groups are distorted; H-type patients consume
more of the new, patent-protected, brand-name drug, while L-type patients consume more of
the generic drug.
It might seem counterintuitive that the price level is higher for the brand-name drug with
a generic substitute, since, normally, we would expect prices to be lower for products that
face stronger competition. The reason for this result is that, due to generic competition, the
22From (11) and (14) we see that λ must be suﬃciently high to secure a non-negative generic drug price,
and thus equilibrium existence. See the Appendix for exact conditions.
12optimal strategy of ﬁrm 0 is to concentrate exclusively on serving the H-type patients and
leave the L-types to the generic competitor. Since ﬁrm 0 competes only for H-patients, with
less price-elastic demand, while ﬁrm 1 competes for both patient types, ﬁrm 0 sets a higher
price than ﬁrm 1 in equilibrium.23 This theoretical result is reminiscent of several empirical
ﬁndings of price increases for brand-name drugs after the entry of generic substitutes in the
market.24,25















(1 + ∆1 − 3∆G)(3t∆G − γv(1 − θ)). (20)
3.2 Reference pricing
Consider now the implementation of a reference pricing system. This implies that some drugs
are aggregated into a cluster and are subject to the same reference price p. The introduction
of a reference pricing system involves the following decision-making.
First, the regulator must decide which drugs to include in a cluster, or reference group.
In our model, this choice boils down to whether or not the new brand-name drug should be
included. Inclusion of the horizontally diﬀerentiated new drug implies therapeutic reference
pricing (TRP). On the other hand, if the reference group consists only of the old brand-
name drug and its generic substitute, the reimbursement system is characterised as generic
reference pricing (GRP).
Second, the regulator must decide on the reference price level. In most countries, this
level is set at, or close to, the lowest drug price in the cluster. In the present analysis, we
23Obviously, this result depends also on our assumption that the new horizontally diﬀerentiated product is
not of higher quality than the old oﬀ-patent product.
24The empirical study by Grabowski and Vernon (1992) shows that generic entry was followed by price
increases by the branded producer, a result later conﬁrmed by Frank and Salkever (1997). This ﬁnding was
called the "generic competition paradox" by Scherer (1993).
25In our model, it does not necessarily follow that generic entry leads to a higher price for the oﬀ-patent drug.
Under the assumption of full market coverage in both patient segments, it is easily shown that equilibrium
prices in the duopoly case, without generic competition, is given by p0 = p1 =
t
α, implying that generic entry
leads to lower prices, although the price reduction is smallest for the oﬀ-patent drug 0. However, generic entry
might lead to increased prices for the oﬀ-patent drug, if the L-segment is not fully covered in the duopoly
equilibrium.
13follow this practice by assuming that the lowest price in the reference group — i.e., the generic
price — is chosen as the reference price level: p = pG.
3.2.1 Therapeutic reference pricing (TRP)
Under TRP, the reference group consists of all three drugs in the therapeutic market, also
the horizontally diﬀerentiated drug 1. By the assumption of p = pG, the copayments faced







i − (1 − α)pTRP
G if i =0 ,1
αpTRP
G if i = G
. (21)
The copayments diﬀer as compared to NRP, since the patients that are prescribed one of the
original drugs are now also fully liable for the price diﬀerence with respect to the reference
price.
As before, explicit expressions for the proﬁt functions under the NRP-system are found
by using (21) in (4)-(7), and the derivation of the equilibrium is similar to that under the
NRP-system. We ﬁnd equilibrium prices under TRP to be given by
pTRP
i = αpNRP
i ,i =0 ,1,G. (22)
Thus, compared with NRP, TRP implies that prices are set as if α =1 . The reason is that,
with TRP, the patients are fully liable for any price increase above the reference level. This
also implies that equilibrium prices are independent of the coinsurance rate α.F u r t h e r m o r e ,
since equilibrium market shares are independent of α, both patient types are equally distorted
under the two regimes.
Proposition 2 In equilibrium, relative price diﬀerences and market shares are equal under
NRP and TRP.
Compared with the NRP-case, the (uniform) downward pressure on drug prices under
TRP is also reﬂected in lower equilibrium proﬁts, now given by
πTRP
i = απNRP
i ,i =0 ,1,G. (23)
143.2.2 Generic reference pricing (GRP)
Under GRP, only generic substitutes are grouped into the same cluster as the original, oﬀ-
patent drugs. Horizontally diﬀerentiated, but therapeutically equivalent, drug versions are







i − (1 − α)pGRP
G if i =0
αpGRP
i if i =1 ,G
. (24)
While only a fraction α of the drug price needs to be paid on drugs G and 1,p a t i e n t st h a t
are prescribed the brand-name drug 0 must additionally pay the full price diﬀerence between
the original drug and the generic substitute.
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b ∆ := 4α +5 λ − 2αλ − 4λ2 + λ3 + αλ2 +4> 0, (28)
e ∆ := 8α +8 λ − 6αλ − 5λ2 + λ3 +2 αλ2 + α2λ>0, (29)
∆ := 10α + λ − 6αλ +2 λ2 − λ3 + αλ2 +2 α2λ>0, (30)
Γ := 3t − γv(1 − θ)(1− α) > 0. (31)
Using the equilibrium prices derived above, we can ﬁnd the equilibrium market shares





















15Comparing with (16)-(17), it is also relatively straightforward to verify that
e xGRP
j > e xTRP
j = e xNRP
j ,j = H,L, (34)
implying that more patients choose one of the drugs included in the reference cluster under
GRP — drug 0 and G.
In order to evaluate the ranking of equilibrium prices under GRP, we now make a rather
weak assumption on the coinsurance rate, namely that α<2
3. We are then able to make the
following characterisation of the pricing equilibrium under generic reference pricing:26
Proposition 3 Assume that α<2
3. Then, under GRP, the brand-name ﬁrm without a
generic substitute always charges the highest price in equilibrium. Both patient groups are
generally distorted; the L-types always consume more of the generic drug, while the H-types
consume more of the new patent-protected brand-name drug, if λ and/or t are suﬃciently
low, and more of the old oﬀ-patent product otherwise.
A proof is given in the Appendix.
We see that the ranking of equilibrium prices changes under a generic reference price
system; the price is now higher for the brand-name drug without a generic substitute. The
reason is simply that drug 1 is not included in the reference cluster. If a consumer chooses
this drug, her copayment is given by a share α on the total drug price. In contrast, if she
chooses the oﬀ-patent drug 0, which is included in the reference cluster, she must pay the
full price diﬀerence between the generic substitute and the brand-name drug. Thus, by not
having its product included in the reference group, ﬁrm 1 faces a less elastic demand and
will consequently charge a higher price in equilibrium.
In contrast to the NRP or TRP systems, equilibrium price diﬀerences do not automat-
ically translate into equivalent diﬀerences in equilibrium market shares. The reason is the
asymmetry introduced by diﬀerent copayments for patients, depending on whether or not the
demanded drug is subject to reference pricing. Consequently, even if ﬁrm 1 sets the highest
drug price, it may not be the most expensive alternative for consumers, and consequently,
this ﬁrm may have a higher market share in the H-segment. From Proposition 3 we see that
26We have tried, with no success, to ﬁnd numerical examples where the ranking of equilibrium prices change
for α>
2




). Thus, we believe
that the results apply for all α ∈ (0,1). Unfortunately, we are not able to prove this analytically.
16this is will be the case if λ and/or t are suﬃciently low. In this case, the price of the on-patent
drug is kept relatively low by incentives to capture a larger share of the L-segment (which
is more important the lower the level of λ) and/or ﬁerce competition due to a relatively low
degree of horizontal diﬀerentiation.
On the other hand, the location of the indiﬀerent L-type patient is always distorted
towards drug 1, as before. In other words, due to the price diﬀerence between generic and
brand-name drugs, a larger share of L-patients consume the generic drug G. Finally, it
should be noted that, even though the H-segment may be distorted ‘both ways’ under GRP,
the L-segment is always more distorted towards drug 1.T h i s c a n e a s i l y b e v e r i ﬁed from
(32)-(33) by conﬁrming that e xGRP
L > e xGRP
H .
Using the equilibrium prices reported in (25)-(27), we can derive equilibrium proﬁts under
GRP. These proﬁt expressions are rather messy, and are therefore relegated to the Appendix.
3.3 Price comparison
As a next step, in order to evaluate how the reimbursement system aﬀects drug prices, let
us compare equilibrium price levels for the same drugs across diﬀerent regimes. Using the





i ,i =0 ,1,G, (35)
for all t>t .I no t h e rw o r d s :
Proposition 4 The price of every drug in the therapeutic market is highest under NRP and
lowest under TRP.
This result reﬂects and conﬁrms the main rationale behind reference pricing. By intro-
ducing a reference pricing system, price competition is generally increased since the price
elasticity of drug demand increases for prices above the reference price level. Furthermore,
this eﬀect is stronger if more drugs are included in the reference cluster, implying that drug
prices are lower under TRP than under GRP. Since prices are strategic complements, the
introduction of a reference price system of either kind puts a downward pressure on the
prices of all drugs in the market. Compared with the NRP case, the introduction of generic
reference pricing has a direct negative eﬀect on the price level of drug 0, which, in turn,
17leads to a reduction also in the price of drug 1, even though this drug is not included in the
reference cluster under GRP. Furthermore, by going from GRP to TRP, ﬁrm 1 gets a direct
incentive to cut its drug prices, which then indirectly leads to a further price reduction also
for drug 0. Finally, lower prices for brand-name drugs imply that the generic producer must
also lower its price in order to stay in the market.
4M a r k e t e n t r y
Let us now turn to the question of market entry. When interpreting the market in question as
country-speciﬁc therapeutic market, demarcated by national regulation, we can realistically
assume that ﬁrm 1 will enter this particular market (i.e., oﬀer its newly developed product
in this country) only if expected proﬁts from sales in this market cover the market entry
costs. When considering the costs and beneﬁts of entry, the ﬁrm must take into account how
the reimbursement policy in a given country is likely to aﬀect proﬁts from drug sales in this
country.
In our model, there is a clear-cut ranking of equilibrium proﬁts for the potential entrant
(ﬁrm 1) across the diﬀerent reimbursement regimes:
Proposition 5 Equilibrium proﬁts of the patent-holding entrant are always highest under
NRP and lowest under TRP.
A proof is given in the Appendix.
The proﬁt comparison between NRP and TRP is straightforward. Compared with the
case of no reference pricing, the TRP system puts a downward pressure on drug prices, while
keeping equilibrium market shares intact, implying that proﬁts are unambiguously lower in
the TRP equilibrium. NRP also outperform GRP, from the viewpoint of ﬁrm 1, since prices
and market shares are higher in the former case. A comparison between GRP and TRP,
on the other hand, shows that prices are higher, but market shares lower, in the former
case. Nevertheless, equilibrium proﬁts are always higher under generic reference pricing.
The reason is that, under GRP, ﬁrm 1 faces drug demand with a lower price elasticity, which
enables this ﬁrm to charge a considerably higher price while suﬀering a moderate loss of
market shares. All else equal, it follows that expected proﬁts for a potential entrant are
18always lowest when entering a market that is subject to therapeutic reference pricing, and
highest when entering a market with no reference pricing.
This result is not surprising, and tallies well with the popular concern about therapeutic
reference pricing with respect to a potential erosion of patent rights, as discussed in the Intro-
duction. However, it is worth noting that a patent-holding ﬁrm can be negatively aﬀected by
reference pricing even if on-patent drugs are exempted from this particular reimbursement
system. In our model, ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts are lower under GRP, compared with no reference
pricing, even if drug 1 is not included in the reference cluster. The reason is that ﬁrm 1 of-
f e r sad r u gt h a ti sa ni m p e r f e c ts ubstitute to the drugs directly aﬀected by the GRP system.
Stronger price competition between ﬁrms 0 and G — induced by generic reference pricing —
implies that ﬁrm 1 is also forced to lower the price of its on-patent drug in order to reduce
the loss of market shares.
5W e l f a r e
In this section, we analyse and discuss the eﬀects of diﬀerent RP systems on social welfare.
We will consider two diﬀerent welfare perspectives: a global welfare perspective where social
welfare is given by the sum of consumer and producer surplus net of third-party payment for
drugs, and a public payer perspective where pharmaceutical proﬁts do not enter the welfare
function. In the ﬁrst part of the section, we make the assumption that expected proﬁts for
ﬁrm 1 are always high enough to secure entry of the new drug. Subsequently, in the latter
part of the section, we discuss policy implications when entry is uncertain. Throughout
the welfare analysis, we also make the following two assumptions: First, we assume that
the regulator does not take into account the "artiﬁcial" vertical diﬀerentiation between the
branded and generic drugs. In other words, the regulator attaches the same gross utility
to objectively homogenous products. We think this is a reasonable (though not trivial)
assumption. Second, we assume, for simplicity, that the public payer is able to raise the
necessary funds for drug payment in a non-distortionary manner.
195.1 Global welfare
If the welfare function is deﬁned as the sum of consumer and producer surplus, net of third-
party payment for drugs, social welfare under reimbursement system k is given by
Wk = U − Ck, (36)
where U denotes patients’ gross utility of drug consumption27,w h i l eCk denotes total mis-
match costs under reimbursement system k. Thus, maximising welfare amounts to minimis-























Clearly, total mismatch costs are minimised if e xk
L = e xk
H = 1
2.I no t h e rw o r d s ,m i s m a t c h
costs are minimised if all patients located at x ≤ 1
2 are prescribed either drug 0 or G,w h i l e
all patients located at x>1
2 are prescribed drug 1. However, due to price diﬀerences, total
mismatch costs will never be minimised in equilibrium. We have previously shown that
e x 6= 1
2 for at least one patient type in all three reimbursement regimes. We also know that
equilibrium market shares are equal under NRP and TRP, implying that total mismatch
costs must also be equal under these two regimes.
The explicit expression for total mismatch costs in each of the three diﬀerent regimes,
which are quite messy, are given in the Appendix. Based on these expressions, we are
able to derive the following unambiguous ranking of reimbursement systems with respect to
equilibrium mismatch costs:
CGRP >C TRP = CNRP. (38)
This constitutes the main result of our welfare analysis:28
Proposition 6 NRP and TRP yield equal mismatch costs in equilibrium, and these are
always lower than under GRP.
27When the perceived vertical diﬀerentiation is not taken into account, patients’ gross utility of drug
consumption is given by U := v(λ +( 1− λ)γ).
28The proof, though conceptually straightforward, involves some extremely tedious and messy algebra and
is thus not reported. However, just to give a brief sketch, it is possible to show that CGRP − CNRP =
ϕ1
ϕ2,
where ϕ2 > 0 and ϕ1 is a convex quadratic function of t which crosses zero from below at t = t.T h u s ,ϕ1 > 0
for t>t . It follows that CGRP >C TRP = CNRP for t>t .
20It follows that, if a regulator seeks to maximise global welfare, generic reference pricing
should never be implemented; mismatch costs would be lower in equilibrium by choosing
either NRP or TRP. In order to explain this result, let us ﬁrst consider the distortive eﬀects
of GRP on each of the two patient types. We know that e xGRP
L > e xTRP
L = e xNRP
L > 1
2, due
to the larger price diﬀerence between the generic drug and the horizontally (and vertically)
diﬀerentiated drug 1 under GRP.29 This implies that GRP always increases total mismatch
costs in the L-segment. For H-types, on the other hand, we know that e xTRP




H > e xTRP
H = e xNRP
H . However, since e xGRP
H ≶ 1
2, it is possible that GRP reduces
aggregate mismatch costs for the H-types if e xGRP
H is suﬃciently close to the midpoint of
t h el i n es e g m e n tS. Nevertheless, a possible reduction in mismatch costs for H-types will
always be more than outweighed by the increase in mismatch costs for L-types. The reason
is twofold. First, mismatch costs are reduced for H-types only if λ — the fraction of H-types
in the population — is suﬃciently low (cf. Proposition 3), in which case the contribution
of H-types to total mismatch costs is also relatively low. Second, since the location of the
indiﬀerent L- t y p ei sf u r t h e ra w a yf r o mt h em i d p o i n to fS in all regimes, the eﬀect of a
marginal relocation of the indiﬀerent patient on total mismatch costs is — all else equal —
larger in the L-segment.
The result stated in Proposition 6 is perhaps somewhat surprising. It certainly runs con-
trary to the popular concern about the discriminatory eﬀects of therapeutic reference pricing,
that this reimbursement system forces a larger number of patients to opt for a less suitable
drug — thereby increasing mismatch costs — simply to avoid the extra copayment. However,
this is not the case in our model. True, therapeutic reference pricing will increase overall
mismatch costs for given prices, if we use the NRP-case as a benchmark. But this argument
ignores the fact that pharmaceutical ﬁrms will adjust their pricing policies according to the
drug reimbursement system. In our speciﬁcm o d e l ,w eh a v es e e nt h a tT R Pw i l ll e a dt oa
proportionally equal reduction in all drug prices, leaving patients’ drug choices unaﬀected in
equilibrium, compared with NRP. Generic reference pricing, on the other hand, will lead to
more distorted drug choices, due to larger equilibrium price diﬀerences within the therapeu-
tic market. Since the on-patent drug is exempted from reference pricing under GRP, ﬁrm








1 . Thus, when comparing GRP and
TRP, the equilibrium price diﬀerence between drug 1 and drug G under GRP is suﬃciently large to (more
than) compensate for the lower copayment share, leading to a larger distortion in the L-segment towards drug
G.
211 faces a less price-elastic demand than its competitors and can thus charge a considerably
higher price in equilibrium. This, in turn, induces more patients to choose the drugs that
are included in the reference cluster, leading to higher overall mismatch costs.30
5.2 Public payer objectives
The welfare function given by (36) is relevant also for countries with a signiﬁcant pharma-
ceutical industry. However, in countries where the pharmaceutical industry is absent (or
insigniﬁcant), it is reasonable to assume that total drug expenditures enter the welfare func-
tion directly. Indeed, a stated desire behind the introduction of reference pricing in many
countries is precisely to curb total outlays on pharmaceuticals. In the following, we will
therefore consider a more narrow public payer objective, where the welfare function is given
by consumer surplus net of third-party payments. We can interpret this as national welfare in
countries with no pharmaceutical industry. In this case, social welfare under reimbursement
system k is given by




With this particular welfare function, maximising welfare amounts to minimising the
sum of mismatch costs and drug expenditures.31 It is straightforward to show that total
proﬁts, and thus total spending on pharmaceuticals, are lowest under TRP and highest
under NRP. This follows, for the most part, directly from the previously derived price and
proﬁtr a n k i n g s . 32 Furthermore, we know from Proposition 6 that TRP always yields equal
or lower total mismatch costs in equilibrium, compared with NRP or GRP. Thus, we reach
the following unambiguous conclusion:
Proposition 7 Both mismatch costs and drug expenditures are minimised under TRP.
It follows that social welfare — as deﬁned by (39) — is always higher under TRP.
30If we include the perceived quality diﬀerence between branded and generic drugs in the welfare function,
total mismatch costs will be even higher under GRP (compared with NRP or TRP), since GRP induces more
patients to choose the generic drug.
31Under the assumption of zero production costs, total drug expenditures (from patients and the public
payer) are equal to total proﬁts.
32T h eo n l yp o s s i b l ea m b i g u i t ya r i s e si nt h ec o m p a r i s o nb e t w e e nN R Pa n dG R P ,s i n c eb o t hﬁrms 0 and
G have lower prices but higher market shares under GRP. However, this ambiguity is easily resolved by
the following argument: Going from NRP to GRP, expenditures obviously decrease for the segments where
patients consume the same drug in the two regimes, since all prices are lower under GRP. Then there is a
segment where H-patients switch from drug 1 to drug 0, and a segment where L-patients switch from drug











In the above analysis, we have considered two polar welfare perspectives, where pharma-
ceutical proﬁts are given either full or no weight in the regulator’s objective function. In
general, the relative weighting of mismatch costs and drug expenditures in the welfare func-
tion is likely to depend on the relative importance of the pharmaceutical industry in the
country in question. The more important the pharmaceutical industry is, the less concerned
a regulator should be about pharmaceutical spending. In any case, though, as long as the
regulator places any weight on pharmaceutical spending at all, the above analysis clearly
suggests that a therapeutic reference price system should be implemented, as, compared
with the other considered alternatives, this reimbursement scheme minimises both mismatch
costs and pharmaceutical expenditures.
However, this result is reached under the assumption of certain entry of drug 1,a n d
the above conclusion is only valid if there is indeed an additional, horizontally diﬀerentiated
drug version that can be included in the therapeutic cluster. Since equilibrium proﬁts are
lowest under TRP (cf. Proposition 5), this reimbursement system makes market entry least
likely, for a given level of market entry costs. If the possibility of no market entry is taken
into account, then the welfare considerations are no longer clearly in favour of TRP. First,
no entry will lead to maximal mismatch costs, because only one treatment version (drug
0 and its generic substitute) is oﬀered in the market. Second, the absence of competition
from a horizontally diﬀerentiated drug will lead to increased drug prices — and thus increased
pharmaceutical spending — under both NRP and GRP. In this scenario, the regulator must
take into account how the choice of reimbursement system is likely to aﬀect the probability
of market entry for new drugs.
No clear-cut conclusions can be made about the optimal choice of reimbursement system.
However, based on the above analysis, we can make the following classiﬁcation of scenaria.
Therapeutic reference pricing —w h i c hm i n i m i s e sb o t hm i s m a t c hc o s t sa n dd r u gp r i c e s—i s
clearly the socially favourable reimbursement system if market entry costs are low, with a
corresponding low risk of no market entry for new drugs. However, if this is not the case,
then either NRP or GRP might be necessary to stimulate market entry. There is then a
case for no reference pricing — which minimises mismatch costs but maximises drug prices
— in countries where drug prices do not play an important role for social welfare, due to
23a dominant pharmaceutical industry. On the other hand, generic reference pricing might
be the favoured reimbursement system in countries where the pharmaceutical industry is
insigniﬁcant or non-existent, since GRP leads to lower drug prices than NRP.
6 Extension: The case of no coinsurance
Some regulatory systems — like in the Netherlands and the US Medicaid — do not expose
patients to coinsurance. In this section, we therefore consider the special case of α =0 ,a n d
check whether our main results still apply. It is, however, worth noticing that α could be
interpreted as the prescribing physicians’ price consciousness (see, e.g., Hellerstein, 1998).
Thus, the case of α =0also implicitly relies on the assumption that the physician is a perfect
agent for the patients only, and therefore do not take the payer’s potential expenditures into
account. We retain all assumptions of our main model, with the exception that α is now set
to zero.33
Consider ﬁrst the case of no reference pricing (NRP). In this regime, consumers will be
insentitive to price diﬀerences when choosing which drug to purchase; only the drugs’ vertical
and horizontal characteristics matter. As a consequence, no consumer demands the generic
drug, since this is perceived to be of lower quality than the two brand-names. The choice
between the two brand-name drugs is solely determined by their horizontal characteristics.
Since the two drugs are symmetrically diﬀerentiated, each brand-name receives half of the
market, i.e., D0 = D1 =1 /2, irrespective of their price setting.
The proﬁt functions of the brand-name ﬁrms are, thus, π0 = p0/2 and π1 = p1/2.
Obviously, both ﬁrms would charge the maximum possible price. Let b p denote the maximum
price the ﬁrms are able to obtain. This price can be interpreted as a price cap imposed
by the payer or the outcome of negotiations between payers and ﬁrms. Alternatively, if the
i n s u r a n c em a r k e ti sc o m p e t i t i v e ,s u c ht h a tp a y e r sh a v en om a r k e tp o w e r ,w ec a nt h i n ko fb p
as the price that makes the payers’ budget constraint bind, i.e., the actuarily fair premium.
The determination of this maximum price is beyond the scope of this paper. In the following,
we just assume that it exists. Thus, under no reference pricing, the equilibrium prices are
33As previously argued, introducing a ﬁxed copayment f for drug consumption would not aﬀect the results
as long as f is equal for all drugs. This also applies when α =0 . Thus, for simplicity, we retain our assumption




1 = b p (40)
The generic ﬁrm obtains zero demand and proﬁts, and is therefore not active in this equi-
librium. Thus, a copayment system with no coinsurance is harmful for generic competition.
The reason is simply that, under this system, demand is perfectly inelastic to prices.
Consider now the case of therapeutic reference pricing (TRP). In Section 3, we saw that
the equilibrium outcomes under TRP are independent of the coinsurance rate. Consequently,
the equilibrium presented in Section 3 for TRP applies also for the special case of α =0 .A s
previously shown, since, with TRP, patients are fully liable for any price increase above the
reference price, the ﬁrms respond to TRP by setting prices as if the patients had no insurance
coverage (α =1 ). This implies that equilibrium prices are independent of the coinsurance
rate.
Finally, consider the case of generic reference pricing (GRP). In this case, patients must
pay the price diﬀerence p0−pG if they choose the original brand-name drug 0, but not if they
choose the horizontally diﬀerentiated drug 1. The derivation of the equilibrium is similar to
t h ec a s eo fα>0. Note, however, that there is no eﬀectual horizontal competition under
GRP when α =0 ,s i n c eﬁrm 1 has no means to attract patients. Thus, the equilibrium
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for λ ∈ (0,1), it follows that e xGRP
H < e xGRP
L < 1
2.T h u s , b o t h
patient segments are distorted towards drug treatment 1, and the distortion is higher in
the H-segment. This is quite intuitive, since, when comparing drug G and drug 0,t h e
brand-name drug is perceived to be of higher quality without being more expensive for
patients, while, when comparing drug 0 and drug 1, patients must pay a surcharge equal to
pGRP
0 − pGRP
G if choosing drug 0.
While equilibrium proﬁts for ﬁrm 1 — and thus the proﬁtability of market entry — obviously
depends on the magnitude of b p, we notice that equilibrium market shares do not depend on
this price. Consequently, it is — in principle — straightforward to compare aggregate mismatch
costs under the three diﬀerent reimbursement schemes also for the special case of α =0 .W e
immediately realise that NRP now yields minimal mismatch costs, since ﬁrm 0 and ﬁrm
1 split the market equally between them. However, this is only because there is no room
for generic competition without coinsurance.35 Thus, the interesting comparison is between
GRP and TRP. A key result in our previous analysis is that GRP yields the highest health
risks, measured as total mismatch costs. Does this still apply in a system without coinsurance
(i.e., α =0 )?
From (41)-(45), we can derive equilibrium mismatch costs under GRP with no coinsur-
ance; these are reported in the Appendix. Since e xGRP
H < e xGRP
L < 1
2, we already know that
mismatch costs are never minimised under GRP. Whether GRP or TRP yields the highest
health risks with no coinsurance depends on a comparison of (C1) and (C10), given in the
Appendix. Unfortunately, it is infeasible to provide an analyical characterisation of this
diﬀerence. However, numerical simulations strongly suggest that CGRP|α=0 >C TRP for the
valid parameter conﬁgurations.36 Thus, total mismatch costs seem to be higher under GRP
also for the special case of no coinsurance.
The causes of the larger distortion under GRP are somewhat diﬀerent from the previous
case, though. When α>0, GRP yields higher mismatch costs mainly because of increased
distortion towards the generic drug in the L-segment. However, with no coinsurance, GRP
35There could be room for generic competition without coinsurance if patients have to pay a ﬁxed fee that
is lower for generic drugs than for brand-name drugs. This possibility is not pursued in the present model.
36More details are available from the authors upon request.
26creates a relatively strong distortion — in both patient segments — towards drug 1, as explained
above. Under TRP, on the other hand, there is an extra copayment, in equilibrium, for
consumption of drug 1. This contributes to a more symmetric outcome, compared with
GRP, with less distorted drug choices.
7 Discussion and concluding remarks
We have analysed the eﬀects of reference pricing systems for pharmaceuticals, focusing on
a speciﬁc therapeutic market with potentially three pharmaceutical ﬁrms. Two of the ﬁrms
oﬀer horizontally diﬀerentiated brand-name drugs. One of these drugs is oﬀ-patent and faces
competition from a generic version oﬀered by a third ﬁrm. The other drug is on-patent and
will be introduced in the market, if the proﬁts are suﬃcient to cover the entry costs.
This framework has allowed us to compare generic reference pricing (GRP) and thera-
peutic reference pricing (TRP), as well as the benchmark-case of no reference pricing (NRP).
We have shown that TRP triggers competition most, resulting in lower equilibrium prices for
every drug in the therapeutic market. We have also shown that GRP distorts drug choices
most, resulting in a higher level of patient health risks — measured in terms of aggregate
mismatch costs — than the other two reimbursement systems. Thus, TRP is preferable from
the perspective of both the purchaser (payer) and the patients.
Notably, the beneﬁcial role of TRP crucially relies on the assumption that the new on-
patent drug enters the market. If the market entry costs are suﬃciently high, TRP may
in fact result in a worse outcome than both GRP and NRP, as described above. It has,
however, been argued that TRP may induce pharmaceutical ﬁr m st oi n v e s tm o r ei nd r a s t i c
innovations, not subject to reference pricing, rather than non-drastic innovations, which very
likely will be included in a reference group. The trade-oﬀ with respect to therapeutically
similar innovations is thus the following: while innovations of therapeutic substitutes increase
competition and reduce patients’ mismatch costs by oﬀering a diﬀerent variant of treatment
for the same illness, they might crowd out drastic innovations if they reduce the budget
available for R&D. On the other hand, diﬀerent drug versions are often innovated in so-called
R&D-races, implying that therapeutically similar innovations are already in the ‘pipeline’
when the ﬁrst drastic innovation enters the market. A thorough analysis of this issue requires
an explicit model of drug innovations, which is outside the scope of the present paper.
27There are also several other issues related to reference pricing of pharmaceuticals that,
naturally, have not been subject to a full treatment within our model framework. As previ-
ously discussed, an important and much debated issue is how RP systems aﬀect entry of new
drugs. In the present paper, we have focused on entry of therapeutic substitutes. However,
RP systems may also aﬀect entry incentives for generic substitutes. We can reasonably as-
sume that the probability of generic entry increases with expected proﬁts for the producer of
generic drugs. In our model, it is possible to show that — similar to ﬁrm 1 proﬁts — equilib-
rium proﬁts of the generic producer (ﬁrm G) is highest under NRP and lowest under TRP.
Thus, based on our analysis, it is possible to argue that RP — in particular TRP — might
discourage not only entry of therapeutic substitutes, but also generic entry.
A related issue is how entry impacts the RP level. It has been argued that entry of new
on-patent drugs may, in fact, raise the RP level. Our model produces the opposite result.
Entry of a new treatment (drug 1) triggers competition, resulting in lower prices and thus a
lower reference price level. One can, however, argue that, if the new drug is of substantially
higher quality than the existing treatment, the producer can charge a higher price, which in
turn may result in a higher RP. This reasoning is correct if we assume existing prices to be
given and thus ignore price responses to the entry of a new treatment. However, entry of a
new and better treatment is likely to induce the incumbent ﬁrms to reduce their prices even
further (compared with entry of a new but equally good treatment) in order to avoid losing
l a r g em a r k e ts h a r e s .I ft h eR Pi ss e te q u a lt ot he lowest price in the cluster, as we assume
in the paper, then surely entry, even of a high-quality treatment, will result in a lower RP
level. However, under a more general RP rule, like a weighted average of all drug prices in a
cluster, the impact of entry on the RP level may be indeterminate, with the sign depending
on the weight attached to the new drug treatment relative to the existing treatments.
Another interesting issue is the optimal clustering of drugs in a therapeutic reference
pricing system. Our model — with only three drugs in the therapeutic market — has been
constructed to analyse the policy choice between generic and therapeutic reference pricing.
In other words, the question of optimal clustering has been narrowed to a question of generic
versus therapeutic reference pricing. However, if there are more than two horizontally dif-
ferentiated drugs in a therapeutic market, another related policy question arises: which, and
how many, of these drugs should be included in a therapeutic reference cluster? In other
28words, what is the optimal breadth of a therapeutic cluster under TRP? This is a question
that cannot be addressed directly in the present model. However, our analysis can still shed
some light on the relevant mechanisms and trade-oﬀs involved, and give some indications of
the likely results.
In our model, the breadth of a therapeutic cluster can be captured by the parameter
t. Under TRP, a lower (higher) value of t implies — all else equal — a narrower (broader)
cluster. Obviously, equilibrium prices, with or without reference pricing, are increasing in
t. More substitutability (a lower t) intensiﬁes competition and leads to lower drug price.
However, from (9)-(11) and (22), it is clear that — compared with NRP — the price eﬀect
of TRP is also increasing in t. In other words, the competitive eﬀect of TRP is larger in
markets where there is less competition to begin with. This suggests that, if the regulator is
mainly concerned about reducing drug spending, the therapeutic clusters should be broadly
deﬁned. On the other hand, broader clusters imply a potentially stronger negative eﬀect
on the entry of new drugs. What about the concern for minimising health risks (mismatch
costs)? Our analysis suggests that, as long as all drugs in a therapeutic market are included,
the introduction of TRP does not lead to more distorted drug choices. However, if some
drugs are excluded from the reference cluster, mismatch costs are likely to increase. This
would, in fact, resemble the comparison between GRP and TRP in our model, where the
exclusion of one drug from the reference cluster leads to more asymmetric, and thus more
distorted, drug choices. We can thus speculate that, in order to avoid large distortions in
drug choices under TRP, the reference cluster should either be relatively narrowly deﬁned,
in order to maintain suﬃcient competition between excluded drugs, or very broadly deﬁned,
where all drugs in the therapeutic market are included. Intuitively, the former alternative
will, to a larger extent, stimulate entry of new drugs, while the dampening eﬀect on drug
spending will be more moderate.
Finally, our modelling of RP is also, naturally, stylised to a point where it is not possible
to capture the full variety of diﬀerent reimbursement systems that can be observed across
diﬀerent countries. One important policy option that has not been considered in the present
paper is tiered formularies, where patients are exposed to diﬀerent copayments according
to a drug’s status in the formulary of the beneﬁt plan. Typically, patients face the highest
copayment (or even no coverage) for drugs not included in the formulary, medium copayment
29for listed brand-name drugs, and lowest copayment for listed generic drugs. Tiered formula-
ries are thus close to a coinsurance system in the sense that it aims at inducing patients to
purchase cheaper drugs with similar therapeutic eﬀects. Now, if a plan with a three-tiered
formulary speciﬁes the diﬀerent copayments as ci = αpi,i=0 ,1,G, then the NRP regime
would in fact be equivalent to a tiered formulary system. Obviously, the correspondence
between drug prices and copayments may not be so direct. If the diﬀerent copayments are
not very responsive to drug prices, we are, in eﬀect, back to the case of no coinsurance,
with the only diﬀerence that relative copayments will shift market shares.37 In this case,
tiered formularies do not aﬀect pricing decisions, they only shift demand towards drugs with
lower copayments, implying that the analysis of a tiered formulary would not be qualitatively
diﬀerent from the present analysis.
37More precisely, the demand structure would be like the following:
h XH = h xH −
f0 − f1
2t




30A Derivation of the price equilibrium
In a vertically separating equilibrium, characterised by a price vector (p0,p 1,p G),t h ef o l l o w -
ing conditions must hold:
Condition 1: pG ≥ 0.
Condition 2: UL (x,G) ≥ UL (x,0).
Condition 3: UH (x,0) ≥ UH (x,G).
Condition 4: UH (e xH,0) ≥ 0.
Condition 5: UL (e xL,G) ≥ 0.
Condition 6: π0 (p0,p 1,p G) ≥ π0 (b p0,p 1,p G), where b p0 solves UL (x,G)=UL (x,0).
Condition 7: πG (p0,p 1,p G) ≥ πG (p0,p 1, b pG), where b pG solves UH (x,0) = UH (x,G).
The ﬁrst condition simply states that the generic price must be non-negative. Conditions
2-3 ensure that the equilibrium really separates, i.e., that H-types choose the brand-name
drug 0,w h i l eL-types choose the generic substitute. Conditions 4 and 5 secure full market
coverage, requiring that the indiﬀerent patients obtain non-negative utility from purchasing
and consuming either of the drugs. Finally, Condition 6 (7) ensures that Firm 0 (Firm G)
has no incentive to deviate by reducing its price and serve the L-types (H-types).
In the following, we will derive the price equilibrium in detail for the NRP-case. For the
two other cases — where the derivation of the equilibrium follows an identical procedure — we
will just present the constraints that support the equilibrium.
A.1 No reference pricing (NRP)
Proﬁt functions are given by (7), with ci = αpi.L e t u s ﬁrst conﬁrm that unconstrained
pricing by all three ﬁrms cannot constitute an equilibrium. Unconstrained maximisation of












[t + αp1 − γv(1 − θ)], (A3)































We can show that this price vector always violates Condition 2. In the NRP-case, Condition
2 can be expressed as
pG ≤ p0 −
1
α
γv(1 − θ). (A7)
Using (A4) and (A6), this condition reduces to 2 ≥ 5, which is a contradiction. In other
words, (A4)-(A6) cannot be an equilibrium, because pG is too high to induce even the L-type
patients to buy the generic drug. Consequently, we must look for an equilibrium where the
generic drug is priced suﬃciently low, so that not only are the L-types not induced to switch
to drug 0, but ﬁrm 0 must also have no incentive to capture the L-types by lowering its price
from the equilibrium level.
Using (A1)-(A2), we can express the proﬁto fﬁrm 0 as a function of pG:
π0 (pG)=




Firm 0 can drive the generic competitor out of the market, and capture equal shares of the
H-a n dL-types, by setting a price
b p0 = pG +
1
α
γv(1 − θ), (A9)
which yields a "deviation" proﬁtg i v e nb y
b π0 (pG)=
[6t − (2 + λ)(αpG +( 1− θ)γv)](αpG +( 1− θ)γv)
2αt(4 − λ)
. (A10)
32The optimal strategy for ﬁrm G is thus to set a price pG that is just low enough to make
such a deviation unproﬁtable. This price is given by the solution to
π0 (pG)=b π0 (pG). (A11)
We can thus derive the price equilibrium by solving the three equations (A1), (A2) and
(A11). The solution is presented as (9)-(11) in Section 3.
It remains to specify Conditions 1-7 for the NRP-case. By construction of the equilibrium,
we know that Condition 6 is automatically satisﬁed. We can also show that Condition 2 is
always satisﬁed. In the NRP-case, this condition is given by
θγv − αpNRP
G ≥ γv − αpNRP
0 , (A12)
which, using (9) and (11), reduces to
∆0 − ∆G ≥ 0, (A13)
which is true for all λ ∈ (0,1). The remainder of the constraints can be expressed in the
form of 4 diﬀerent conditions on t. From (11), we see that a non-negative generic drug price






Furthermore, non-negative utility for the indiﬀerent consumers of the H-a n dL-type, re-












The necessary Condition 7 is not analytically solvable. However, to simplify, we can ﬁnd a
suﬃcient condition on t that satisﬁes Conditions 3 and 7 simultaneously. By assuming that
H-types always prefer drug 0 over drug G for the equilibrium price pNRP
0 and a zero-priced
generic drug (i.e., pG =0 ), it must be true that H-types always prefer drug 0 in equilibrium
33(for a non-negative generic drug price) and that price-undercutting by the generic ﬁrm in
order to capture H-type consumers is not an option. Using pNRP
0 from (9), and setting




















. In general, existence
of the equilibrium requires that the share of L-types is relatively low, combined with a
suﬃciently large diﬀerence in gross valuations between the two types. To give an illustrative
numerical example, assume that v =1 , λ =0 .9, θ =0 .8 and γ =0 .4.I nt h i sc a s e ,t =0 .12
and t
NRP = tNRP
7 =0 .20. Note also that the equilibrium exists for an even wider range of
mismatch costs, since the upper bound t
NRP in this case is a suﬃcient, but not necessary,
condition.
A.2 Therapeutic reference pricing (TRP)
The price equilibrium under TRP is derived similarly to the NRP-case, and given by (22) in
Section 3. As before, Condition 6 is automatically satisﬁed. Furthermore, Conditions 1 and
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. (A20)













. It is worth noting that, due to lower equilibrium prices,
the range of mismatch costs for which the equilibrium exists is generally wider under TRP.
Using the same numerical example as in the NRP-case, with a 10 per cent copayment rate
(α =0 .1), the lower and upper bounds on t are given by t =0 .12 and t
TRP = tTRP
7 =0 .34.
34A.3 Generic reference pricing (GRP)
The price equilibrium under GRP is derived similarly to the NRP- and TRP-cases, and given
by (25)-(27) in Section 3. As before, Condition 6 is automatically satisﬁed.
Using (25)-(27), we can derive the remainder of the conditions that support the equilib-
rium under GRP. Once more, it can be shown that Condition 1 is satisﬁed if t ≥ t,i m p l y i n g
that Condition 1 is identical for all three regimes.





(1 − α)γ (1 − θ)v. (A21)
Since tGRP
1 ≥ (1 − θ)γv, it follows that t ≥ tGRP
2 . Thus, as long as Condition 1 is satisﬁed,
Condition 2 is also automatically satisﬁed. Conditions 4 and 5 are given by, respectively,
t ≤ tGRP
4 :=
2e ∆v +( 1− α)(1− θ)γv
³
3(2+α)+κ − 2b ∆
´











e ∆(1 + θ)+( 1− θ)
h
(1 − α)[2(2+α)+ς] − b ∆(1 − 2α)
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(λ(2α +1 )− 6α). (A25)
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¢ . (A26)













. Once more, due to the general price reducing
eﬀect of reference pricing, the range of mismatch costs for which the equilibrium exists is
35generally wider also under the GRP system, compared with the NRP case. Using the same




B Equilibrium proﬁts under GRP
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2te ∆2 , (B3)
where
Ω := 2tω1 + γv(1 − α)(1− θ)ω2, (B4)
ω1 := 6 4 αλ +8 α2 +2 λ2 +9 λ3 − 12λ4 +6 λ5 − λ6 (B5)
−86αλ2 − 8α2λ +4 0 αλ3 +4 α3λ − 6αλ4 +1 9 α2λ2
−13α2λ3 − 4α3λ2 +3 α2λ4 +2 α3λ3,
ω2 := 1 6 αλ +8 α2 +2 6 λ2 − 41λ3 +2 6 λ4 − 8λ5 + λ6 − 30αλ2 − 16α2λ (B6)
+28αλ3 − 12αλ4 +2 αλ5 +1 3 α2λ2 − 5α2λ3 + α2λ4,
Ψ := γv(1 − α)(1− θ)
¡




2α − 7λ +7 λ2 − 2λ3 − αλ2 + α2λ
¢
,
36Φ := 1 3 6 α2 − 16αλ +1 0 λ2 − 5λ3 +2 λ4 − 4λ5 + λ6 +8 2 αλ2 (B8)
−192α2λ − 60αλ3 +4 0 α3λ +1 6 αλ4 − 2αλ5 + 105α2λ2
−13α2λ3 − 24α3λ2 − 3α2λ4 +4 α3λ3 +4 α4λ2,
Θ := 3t
¡
αλ − 3λ + λ2 +4
¢




(4 − λ)Γ. (B9)
C Equilibrium mismatch costs
Inserting the expressions for the locations of indiﬀerent patients in the diﬀerent reimburse-
ment regimes — reported throughout Section 3—i n t o( 3 7 ) ,e q u i l i b r i u mm i s m a t c hc o s t sa r e
given by












3λ − 3λ2 + λ3 +8
¢2 , (C1)
where























ξ := 1 6 αλ − 12λ − 4α2 +2 3 λ2 − 17λ3 +4 λ4 − 18αλ2 +5 α2λ (C4)
+4αλ3 − 2α3λ + αλ4 − 3α2λ2 +2 α2λ3 + α3λ2,
z := 7 2 λ +6 4 αλ + 104α2 − 94λ2 +7 4 λ3 − 53λ4 +2 5 λ5 − 4λ6 (C5)
−150α2λ − 30αλ3 +2 0 α3λ +4 4 αλ4 − 10αλ5 +6 6 α2λ2
+7α2λ3 − 12α3λ2 − 6α2λ4 +2 α3λ3 +2 α4λ2 − 40αλ2,
Λ := 1 2 λ3 − 16αλ − 8α2 − 2λ2 − 8λ − 7λ4 + λ5 +2 4 αλ2 (C6)
+14α2λ − 14αλ3 +2 αλ4 − 8α2λ2 + α2λ3,
37Υ := 8αλ − 4λ +4 α2 +5 λ2 − 4λ3 + λ4 − 10αλ2 − 5α2λ +3 αλ3 +2 α2λ2, (C7)
µ := 2 4 λ − 40αλ − 8α2 − 38λ2 +2 9 λ3 − 7λ4 +4 8 αλ2 +1 0 α2λ (C8)
−13αλ3 +2 α3λ − αλ4 − 3α2λ2 − 2α2λ3 − α3λ2,
η := 2 4 λ − 8αλ +8 α2 − 34λ2 +2 1 λ3 − 12λ4 +6 λ5 − λ6 (C9)
+16αλ2 − 14α2λ − 20αλ3 − 2α3λ +1 5 αλ4 − 3αλ5
−5α2λ2 +1 1 α2λ3 +2 α3λ2 − 3α2λ4 − α3λ3.
C.1 GRP with no coinsurance






















1 − λ(2 − λ) − 2(1− λ) (C11)
and
e λ := 2 − λ(2 − λ) − 2
√
1 − λ(1 − λ). (C12)
DP r o o f s
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
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38By the deﬁnition of b ∆,i tc a ne a s i l yb ev e r i ﬁed that the sum of the four terms in the square
brackets in the numerator in (D1) is positive for α ∈ (0,1) and λ ∈ (0,1). The sign of the
expression depends thus on the sign of σ. Once more, it is relatively straightforward to verify
that σ>0 for all λ ∈ (0,1) if α<2
3.T h u s ,α<2
3 is a suﬃcient condition for pGRP
1 >p GRP
0 .





if t > γv (1 − θ)β, (D3)
where









(2α + λ) − 2α + λ +3 αλ +2 λ2 − λ3 − 2αλ2 − α2λ
. (D4)
It is fairly straightforward to verify that β<1 for α ∈ (0,1) and λ ∈ (0,1). This implies that
t>γ v(1 − θ)β (and thus e xGRP
L > 1
2) as long as Condition 1 (non-negative generic price) is
satisﬁed.
Now consider the indiﬀerent type-H patient. From (32), we can characterise e xGRP
H as a






































It follows that e xGRP
H < 1
2 for t>0 if ϑ<1
2 for α ∈ (0,1) and λ ∈ (0,1). On the other hand,
if ϑ>1
2 for some combinations of λ and α, it must be that e xGRP
H > 1
2 if t is suﬃciently
high. Solving ϑ = 1
2 for α yields a function α∗ (λ), such that ϑ<(>) 1
2 if α<(>)α∗ (λ).I t
is straightforward to verify that ∂α∗/∂λ > 0 and that α∗ < 0 for λ<0.54. It follows that
e xGRP
H < 1
2 if λ<0.54,w h e r e a s ,f o rλ>0.54, e xGRP
H > 1
2 if λ and/or t are suﬃciently high.





2, can occur in equilibrium. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5
A direct analytical comparison of equilibrium proﬁts for ﬁrm 1 under the three diﬀerent
regimes is infeasible, since the equilibrium proﬁt expression under GRP is extremely messy.
However, we can prove the proposition via a somewhat more subtle route, by considering how
diﬀerent reimbursement systems aﬀect equilibrium prices and market shares. From Propo-




i , i =0 ,1,G. Regarding equilibrium market shares,
we know that these are identical under NRP and TRP. Furthermore, we also know that
e xGRP
j > e xTRP
j = e xNRP
j , j = H,L. Thus, since pNRP
1 >p GRP
1 >p TRP
1 and demand is at least








. Regarding the comparison between GRP and TRP, it is
not immediately obvious that ﬁrm 1 earns higher proﬁts under GRP, since prices are higher,
but market shares are lower, compared with TRP. Note, however, that equilibrium prices
are higher for all ﬁrms under GRP, compared with TRP. Furthermore, we know that, for
given prices, cGRP
1 <c TRP
1 .T h u s ,i fﬁrm 1 unilaterally deviates from the GRP equilibrium
by setting a price equal to the equilibrium price under TRP, this ﬁrm will increase its market
shares, in both consumer segments, beyond its equilibrium market shares under TRP, and
consequently earn higher proﬁts than under TRP. Such a deviation is not proﬁtable, so ﬁrm
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